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The current practice of corporate income taxation for multinational ﬁrms within the Euro-
pean Union (EU) suﬀers from substantial shortcomings: distortions in factor allocations,
high administrative and compliance costs, tax avoidance through cross-border proﬁt shift-
ing and transfer pricing, incentives for thin capitalisation, etc. To a large extent, these
shortcomings originate from the co-existence of 27 diﬀerent and mutually inconsistent
tax systems and the requirement to set up a separate tax accounting for every country
where a multinational operates. Therefore a comprehensive tax reform that would allow
multinational enterprises to operate with a single, common and consolidated tax base for
their EU-wide businesses has become a top issue in the tax arena of the EU (European
Commission, 2001, 2003, 2006; Devereux, 2004; Sørensen, 2004; Weiner, 2006). In 2004,
the European Commission installed a working group to undertake progress work on the
deﬁnition of the common tax base; a proposal for a directive should be released before
the end of 2008.1
Consolidation of all activities of a multinational corporation to a single tax base raises
the question of how to share this tax base and the attenting tax revenues among the
participating member states. While such sharing could be carried out at the macro level
(Mintz, 2004), micro-approaches that allocate tax revenues in a company-wise manner to
the participating states dominate the discussion and are also preferred by the European
Commission (European Commission, 2006; Weiner, 2006). Most attention has so far been
devoted to formula apportionment (FA), the mechanism practiced between US states or
Canadian provinces (Hellerstein and McLure, 2004).
With FA, a corporation’s tax base is shared among the participating countries according
to a formula that uses one or several apportionment factors. Each factor measures (or
proxies) in a diﬀerent way the fraction of the overall business activities that a ﬁrm runs in
1Apart from being uniform and consolidated, the new tax base should also be sim-
pler and broader than the existing ones. The process of deliberations is documented at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxation/company tax/common tax base/index en.htm.
1the respective country. The tax revenues that accrue to a country out of a multinational’s
operations within its jurisdiction are given by the product of that country’s statutory
tax rate, the value of the apportionment factor according to the formula, and the multi-
national’s total (= EU-wide or worldwide) taxable proﬁts, calculated according to the
common consolidated tax base. A politically and ﬁscally important component of a FA
arrangement is that the participating countries keep full autonomy over their tax rates.
Only the tax base is uniform; tax rates are left to the national governments’ discretion.
On the European level, work on the design of the mechanism to share the consolidated
tax base among member states has not yet been started. Rather, the European Com-
mission expressly views technical issues concerning the sharing mechanism as “relatively
independent” (e.g., European Commission, 2006, p. 7) of those involved in the deﬁnition
of the consolidated tax base. As we argue in this paper, such a view is inappropriate.
Discussions about the design of a common tax base and the mechanism to share it ought
not to be separated.
Speciﬁcally, we elaborate on the interaction between the deﬁnition of the tax base and
the apportionment method in tax competition games. The actual or potential emergence
of tax competition, especially with proﬁt taxes, has ﬁgured prominently in the political
and scientiﬁc debate on taxation in the EU. Switching to a FA system with a consolidated
tax base will not only change incentive structure for companies (investment, workforce
etc.) but also for national governments that use their tax policies (i.e., set their tax
rates) strategically. The status quo of EU corporate income taxation is based on separate
accounting. Here, tax competition is generally viewed to be of the much-feared race-to-
the-bottom type.2 Tax competition under FA taxation may look quite diﬀerent. Several
authors (e.g., Wellisch, 2002; Sørensen, 2003; Pethig and Wagener, 2007) pointed out
that with a consolidated tax base the apportionment method decisively shapes strategic
incentives in tax policies. In particular, the sharing rule may determine whether tax
2Separate accounting encourages ﬁrms to shift taxable proﬁts into low-tax countries. This implies a
positive ﬁscal cross-border externality of corporate income taxes and, thus, triggers a race-to-the-bottom
in tax competition (Nielsen et al., 2004).
2competition is of the “race-to-the-bottom” type (too low tax rates) or of the “race-over-
the-top” type (ineﬃciently high tax rates). In this paper, we demonstrate that the same
phenomenon can occur when, for a given apportionment method, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of
the tax base apply. Moreover, given a formula for tax base apportionment, a change in
the tax base deﬁnition can turn a race-to-the-bottom into a race-over-the-top.
Generally, the type of tax competition is shaped by the sign of ﬁscal externalities, i.e.,
by the spillover eﬀects that one government’s tax activities generates on the objectives
of other governments. Positive ﬁscal externalities lead to ineﬃciently low Nash equilib-
rium tax rates in tax competition, negative ones to ineﬃciently high tax rates (where
cooperative behaviour serves as the benchmark for eﬃciency). With FA taxation, ﬁscal
externalities arise through two channels: tax changes in one country aﬀect the other gov-
ernment both via the shares of tax revenues allocated to the countries and via their impact
on the joint tax base. Underlying both ﬁscal externalities are changes in the behaviour of
ﬁrms (say, with regard to investment). Either of these ﬁscal externalities can be positive
or negative, implying, ﬁrst, that tax competition may come as a race-to-the-bottom as
well as a race-over-the top and, second, that it is the interplay between apportionment
factor and tax base deﬁnition that has to be scrutinized when analyzing tax competition.
As the main result of this paper, we show that the Nash equilibrium tax rate of a tax
competition game under FA taxation is too high [low], relative to the cooperative one, if
and only if the consolidated tax base responds absolutely more [less] elastically to changes
in investment than does the apportionment factor.3
This elasticity condition is shon to have an interesting and simple equivalent in terms of
capital ﬂows: FA tax competition leads to ineﬃciently high [low] tax rates if a tax change
in one country leads to changes in foreign and domestic investment behaviour that go into
the same direction [into opposite directions]. I.e., if tax changes under FA either reduce
or increase both foreign and domestic investment, a negative ﬁscal externality prevails
3Importantly, it is elasticities with respect to investment that matter – and not elasticities with respect
to tax rates.
3(race-over-the-top); otherwise, a positive externality emerges (race-to-the-bottom).
Since the elasticities of tax base and apportionment factor are economically and mathe-
matically independently, the two ﬁscal externalities can be cleanly disentangled. Roughly
this implies, however, that for any given formula for tax base sharing a change in the
deﬁnition of the tax base could turn a race to the bottom into a race over the top.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model of a tax
competition game with FA. Section 3 characterizes the possible outcomes of FA tax com-
petition games. Section 4 exempliﬁes these ﬁndings for two prominent apportionment
methods. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 General description
Inspired by a framework developed in Nielsen et al. (2004) and Sørensen (2003), we
consider a common market that comprises two identical, small open economies, labelled
A and B. The two countries (plan to) operate with a commonly agreed base for taxes
on consolidated proﬁts that is to be shared according to an formula-based apportionment
method. We consider a single representative multinational corporation that operates in
the common market. It has to decide on how much capital Ki to invest in country i = A,B.
Investment decisions determine economic proﬁts. We assume that the economic proﬁt πi
realizable in either country can be clearly identiﬁed and unambiguously attributed to
investment decisions in that country only: πi = π(Ki) where π(·) : R+ → R is a pseudo-
concave function that satisﬁes π(0) ≤ 0, π0(0) = +∞, and that takes strictly positive
values (at least) over some interval of the real line. Pre-tax economic proﬁts of the
multinational total to
Πg(KA,KB) = π(KA) + π(KB).
The multinational ﬁrm has to pay proﬁt taxes to the governments of both countries
4where it operates. Countries A and B share a common rule of how to calculate (national
and consolidated) taxable proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, that common rule deﬁnes the proﬁt tax
base in country i (such that the multinational perceives it) as a function φ(Ki) : R+ → R
which depends on investments in i. The consolidated tax base amounts to4
Φ(KA,KB) = φ(KA) + φ(KB).
Diﬀerences between taxable proﬁts φ(Ki) and economic proﬁts π(Ki) may result from
non-deductible expenses, tax-depreciation rules, tax exemptions, valuation rules, the in-
or exclusion of unrealised incomes and many other details. Divergence of φ from π re-
sults in non-neutrality of proﬁt taxation (i.e., is responsible for tax-induced distortions in
investment behaviour).5
2.2 FA Taxation and Proﬁt Maximization
An apportionment method assigns fractions of the common consolidated tax base Φ to
the countries A and B. These fractions are thought to reﬂect how the ﬁrm allocates its
activities across the two countries. In our simple model these activities are represented
by KA and KB, but in practice some other factors (payroll, sales, etc.) may be included
in the formula. We denote by
α : R
2
+ → [0,1], α = α(KA,KB)
4We assume that measuring assets Ki for the purpose of taxation and FA is unproblematic. In
practice, this may be quite diﬃcult since intangible assets become ever more important for the operation
of ﬁrms. Moreover, we abstract from any tax-motivated transactions within the multinational (like
internal shipments at fabricated transfer prices). This reﬂects the idea that such manoeuvres are no
longer necessary under a common tax base.
5This statement needs to be qualiﬁed in dynamic contexts where divergence of φ and ψ does not
necessarily lead to non-neutral taxation (think, e.g., of business income π in the Schanz-Haig-Simons
deﬁnition together with cash ﬂows as the tax base ψ).
5the share of tax revenues that is assigned to country A. Country B’s share then equals
β := 1 − α(KA,KB).6 We impose the following plausible restrictions on α:
α(KA,KB) + α(KB,KA) = 1, (1a)
α(0,KB) = 0, (1b)
αKA(KA,KB) > 0 > αKB(KA,KB) (1c)
for all values KA,KB > 0; αKi := ∂α/∂Ki. Property (1a) ensures an equal treatment
of countries; relabelling the countries would not change the value of the apportionment
factor. This permits to calculate country B’s share simply as β(KA,KB) = α(KB,KA).
Moreover, if the multinational runs two equally large ﬁrms in A and B then the tax
base is shared equally between A and B: α(K,K) = 0.5 for all K > 0. By properties
(1a) and (1b), if the ﬁrm does not operate in a country, this means a zero tax share for
that country. Property (1c) conveys that an increase in the multinational’s activities in
a country increases that country’s tax share.7
Tax revenues in A and B amount to
TA = tA · α · Φ and TB = tB · (1 − α) · Φ, (2)
and the net proﬁts of the multinational company are given by:
Πn(KA,KB) = Πg(KA,KB) − (tAα + tB(1 − α)) · Φ (3)
The FOCs for optimal investment choices reﬂect that the eﬀective proﬁt tax rate is variable




0(Ki) + (tA − tB) ·
∂α
∂Ki
· Φ − (αtA + (1 − α)tB) · φ
0(Ki) = 0 (i = A,B). (4)
6This seems natural in the context of the EU where member states agree on a common formula ex
ante. When, as in the U.S., states can freely choose their own formulas, fractions need not add up to
unity. In fact, the choice of fractions may be a matter of strategic considerations or bilateral agreement
(see Anand and Sansing, 2000; Wellisch, 2004).
7If two apportionment methods each satisfy properties (1a) to (1c), then so do their convex combina-
tions. A case in point here is the so-called Massachusetts formula, applied in the US, which uses payroll,
property and sales shares in equal proportions.
6The multinational’s responses to tax changes under a FA are quite complex. To simplify
the analysis, we will throughout assume that the identical countries also levy identical
tax rates in the initial situation: tA = tB = t. This then implies identical investment
levels in both countries (KA = KB = K) and α = 1/2. For comparative statics exercises,














for all tA = tB = t. In a symmetric setting, implicit diﬀerentiation of (4) yields the













Observe that the expressions in the denominators of (6a) and (6b) are negative from
the second-order conditions. Hence, a tax increase in country i drives capital out of that
country, ∂Ki(t,t)/∂ti < 0, if (but not only if) φ0(K) and, therefore from (4), also π0(K)
is positive, i.e., if higher investment still lead to an increase in (taxable) proﬁts in i.
However, (6a) also entails the possibility that higher taxes attract capital to a country
(namely, if φ0(K) and, thus, π0(K) are suﬃciently negative). This may, e.g., happen if
the tax base deﬁnition involves generous allowances (see Section 4).
From (6b), the impact of domestic tax increases on investment abroad is unclear when-
ever φ0(K) > 0; otherwise capital will be attracted to the foreign country. However, for
all FA methods with property (1a) a tax increase in any of the two countries changes total






for i = A,B; (7)
A tax increase in one country changes the eﬀective tax rate and thereby changes the
marginal return to investment everywhere. Hence, total investment KA +KB is aﬀected.
8Add up (6a) and (6b) and observe that αKA + αKB = 0 under symmetry.
7Moreover, the country where the tax increase occurs becomes less [more] attractive for
hosting investments with positive [negative] marginal proﬁts, relative to the foreign coun-
try. Hence, marginally proﬁt-increasing domestic investments will always be cut back
upon domestic tax increases. However, in the foreign country two opposing eﬀects are at
work for marginally proﬁt-increasing investments: the overall increase in the eﬀective tax
rate versus the increase in relative attractiveness as a host for investment. That leaves it
generally unclear whether investment increases or declines there.
2.3 Cooperative Solution and Tax Competition
We assume that governments aim at maximizing tax revenues, using the statutory tax
rates tA and tB as their policy instruments. We adopt this Leviathan assumption — which
is common in recent studies on tax competition under FA — to make our point as swiftly
as possible; qualitatively similar (but more complex) eﬀects as the ones derived below can
emerge for diﬀerent objective functions too.
Tax revenues in each country depend, via the ﬁrm’s optimal choices, on both tax rates:
Ti = Ti(tA,tB). Governments can cooperate (joint revenue maximization) or not (tax
competition).
The cooperative solution is the pair of tax rates (t∗
A,t∗
B) that maximizes joint tax revenues
TA + TB, given the taxation method and the common deﬁnition of the tax base. We will
henceforth assume that a unique symmetric cooperative solution (with tax rate t∗) always
exists.
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Given our assumption that the cooperative solution is unique, we obtain that a Nash




≤ 0 for i 6= j ⇐⇒ t
N ≥ t
∗. (8)
Due to symmetry, this condition will be simultaneously met or violated in both countries.
3 Tax Competition with FA
For tax competition under FA we get the following result:
Proposition 1 With non-cooperative proﬁt taxation under FA, a positive [negative] ﬁscal
externality prevails in a symmetric situation whenever a tax increase in one country aﬀects















Fiscal externalities under FA can, thus, be characterized via investment responses at
home and abroad. The probably most relevant case (and the one on which the literature
has so far focussed) occurs when domestic tax increases reduce domestic investment (i.e.,
∂Kj/∂tj < 0). Then (9) states that if capital investment abroad also declines upon domes-
tic tax increases, the foreign government will lose revenues upon a domestic tax increase,
whereas if foreign investment increases, the foreign government will gain additional tax
revenues. While this sounds all too natural, it should be stressed that a tax change in
one country aﬀects the other country’s tax revenues in multiple ways: via a change in the
common proﬁt tax base Φ and via a change in the formula share α, and each of these
eﬀects contains variations in both KA and KB. Proposition 1 then states that all these
changes can be condensed in the sign of the cross-border eﬀects on investment.
As an immediate implication of Proposition 1 and (8), Nash equilibrium tax rates are
too high [too low], relative to the cooperative solution, whenever a tax increase in one
9country aﬀects investment in both countries in diﬀerent [identical] directions. We can,
however, be even more speciﬁc:
Proposition 2 The tax rate in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of a tax competition
game under FA is too high [low] relative to the cooperative one if and only if the common
consolidated tax base Φ responds absolutely more [less] elastically to changes in investment



















where K = K(tN,tN).
From (10), the nature of tax competition under consolidated taxation with FA can only
be determined from analyzing both the tax base and the apportionment method. It is not
enough to look at one of the components only. Proposition 2 oﬀers a precise separation of
the apportionment- and the tax base-eﬀects. Relative to the maximum of a (joint) Laﬀer
curve, tax competition will more likely result in a “race to the bottom” the more elastic
the tax base and in a “race over the top” the more elastic the apportionment factor is
with respect to investment.
It is non-trivial that elasticities with respect to investment matter in Proposition 2.
Recalling that tax revenues in country B are given by T B = tB · (1 − α) · Φ, a positive
[negative] ﬁscal externality will prevail if the elasticity of the common consolidated tax
base Φ with respect to the tax rate tA in country A exceeds [falls short of] the corre-
sponding elasticity of the apportionment factor 1−α. Proposition 2 shows that these tax
elasticities translate one-by-one into elasticities with respect to KA.
By the deﬁnition of Φ, the tax-base elasticity can also be written as φ0(K)K/[2φ(K)].
Moreover, α(K,K) = 0.5 by assumption. Hence, (10) leads to the following condition
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at K = K(tN,tN). Observe that both (10) and (11) are local conditions: they need only
be valid in the Nash equilibrium but not globally.
104 Two Examples
In this section we exemplify that the nature of the tax competition game under FA in fact
is determined by the deﬁnitions of both tax base and apportionment factor. We consider
two prominent apportionment methods (each of whom satisﬁes properties (1a) to (1c)):
property-share and sales-share apportionment. Both methods are applied in the U.S. or
in Canada.
4.1 Apportionment with Property Shares
With property-share apportionment, taxable proﬁts are assigned to countries according





For this method, K ·
∂α(K,K)




0(K)| < φ(K)/K where K = K(t
N,t
N). (13)
Property-share apportionment is the most widely studied sharing method in tax compe-
tition games under FA. All studies so far consider the following set-up: The multinational
ﬁrm earns revenues R(Ki) from its operations in country i and incurs costs C(Ki), both
written here as functions of investment in i. Both revenues and variable costs are zero
in the absence of investment (R(0) = C(0) = 0). Revenues are assumed to be strictly
concave in Ki with R0(0) suﬃciently large,9 and costs are assumed to be increasing and
convex in Ki. Capital costs may reﬂect costs of ﬁnance or economic depreciation of the
capital stock etc. Proﬁts π(Ki) = R(Ki) − C(Ki) are strictly concave then. Taxable
proﬁts are modelled as φ(Ki) = R(Ki) − γ · C(Ki) where γ ≥ 0 measures the degree of
tax-deductibility of costs.
9E.g., the ﬁrm has concave Inada-type production function x = f(Ki) and faces an inverse-demand
function p = p(x). Then revenues R(Ki) = p(f(Ki))f(Ki) are concave in Ki as long as p(x) is not “too
convex” (which will in particular be the case when a competitive output market with p(x) = ¯ p is assumed.
11If at most the full amount of costs is tax-deductible (i.e., if γ ∈ [0,1]), the FOC (4) for
proﬁt-maximization in a symmetric situation always involves φ0(K) ≥ 0 (with equality
iﬀ γ = 1). By the concavity of φ and φ(0) = 0, the RHS of (13) is satisﬁed for all K.
Consequently, ineﬃciently low tax rates (tN < t∗)will emerge from the FA tax competition
game.
However, Sørensen (2003, 2004) argued that FA based on property shares may well lead
to inoptimally high tax rates. This can be easily veriﬁed in the present set-up by allowing
for γ > 1, i.e., by assuming that ﬁrms can tax-deduct more than their true expenses (due,
say, to generous write-oﬀ provisions etc.). Then φ0(K) < 0 will hold in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximum (again see (4)). Thus, concavity of φ does not suﬃce to make the RHS of (13)
hold true. Moreover, it is easy to construct examples such that tax competition under
property-share apportionment leads to excessively high tax rates. One such example is
provided in the Appendix.
Ineﬃciently high tax rates can emerge under property apportionment even without
assuming excessively generous cost deductibility. Assume, e.g., that costs have a ﬁxed
and a variable component: C(K) = ¯ C + ˜ C(K) with ¯ C > 0 and ˜ C(0) = 0. Suppose that
γ ≤ 1, such that φ0(K) > 0 in a ﬁrm’s optimum. The RHS of condition (13) then reads
as:
K(R
0(K) − γ ˜ C
0(K)) < R(K) − γ( ¯ C + ˜ C(K)).
It is straightforward to show that this condition is always satisﬁed for a linear cost function
(i.e., ˜ C(K) = c · K). Hence, ineﬃciently low tax rates will emerge in tax competition.
However, for non-linear ˜ C(K) it is equally straightforward to construct examples such
that the condition above is violated.
4.2 Apportionment with Sales Shares
A further prominent FA method is apportionment according to sales (or output) shares.
Denoting the multinational’s revenues from its operations in country i by Ri, proﬁts are
12assigned according to the formula α = RA/(RA+RB). Assuming that revenues earned in
i depend, apart from some other factors which are exogenous to our model, on investment





In symmetric situations, 4 · K · ∂α(K,K)/∂KA = R0(K)K/R(K). Whenever revenues
are concave in investment, this is smaller than one. From (11), tax competition under
sales-share apportionment will surely lead to a race-over-the-top whenever the elasticity
of the tax base with respect to K exceeds one. For not-so-elastic tax bases, the situation
is less clear.
Consider the set-up of the previous example with proﬁts π = R(K)−C(K) and tax bases
φ = R(K) − γC(K). Assume ﬁrst that there are no ﬁxed costs (C(0) = 0). From (11),
tN ≥ t∗ will then hold for γ < 1 if and only if R0(K)/R(K) < C0(K)/C(K)). However,
C0(K) = R0(K)(1 − t)/(1 − γt) from the FOC (4). Replacing C0(K) and eliminating
R0(K), the RHS of (11) becomes (1 − t)R(K) − (1 − γt)C(K) > 0 which is equivalent
to positive after-tax proﬁts. Reasonably assuming this, tax competition with sales-share
apportionment always leads to ineﬃciently low tax rates.
For γ > 1 (which implies that φ0 = R0 − γC0 < 0), the RHS of (11) reads as 2/γ ≤
C/R − C0/R0. By again replacing C0 from the FOC and then rewriting expression one
sees that this is incompatible with non-negative proﬁts – hence, suboptimally high tax
rates emerge from tax competition.
Linear cost functions C(K) = ¯ C + c · K (with c, ¯ C > 0) also lend themselves to an
instructive example. Analysing (11) it is straightforward to demonstrate that tax rates
in a symmetric Nash equilibrium will be suboptimally low if costs are fully deductible
in the tax base (i.e., for γ = 1) and ineﬃciently high if they are not at all deductible
(i.e., for γ = 0). By continuity, there exists an interior value such that tax competition
generates the cooperative solution. Slightly perturbing that value, however, will lead to
drastic changes in the nature of the tax competition game. Interpreting the share γ of
capital costs that is not tax-deductible as a measure for the “broadness” of the tax base,
13we ﬁnd that the broader [narrower] the tax base the less likely tax competition will be of
the “race-over-the-top” [“race-to-the-bottom”] type.
The case of a linear cost function highlights that indeed both the apportionment method
and the tax base deﬁnition matter: With property-share apportionment a race-to-the-
bottom emerges for all γ ∈ (0,1) (see the previous section) while for the same deﬁnition
of the tax base races-over-the-top are possible with sales-share apportionment.
5 Concluding Remarks
Corporate income tax competition with FA taxation is shaped both by the deﬁnition of
the tax base and by the apportionment method. While the impact of the sharing rule has
been analysed in a number of studies, the role of the tax base has so far been negelected in
the literature. Moreover, as this paper shows, it is the interplay between the two features
that determines FA tax competition.
These insights have a couple of policy implications for the discussion in the European
Union on how to adopt a consolidated tax base with formula-based tax base sharing:
First, switching from separate accounting to FA taxation might alter the nature of the
tax competition game drastically, turning the customary race-to-the-bottom in corporate
tax rates under separate accounting upside down under formula apportionment.
Second, the prospect of ending up on the deccreasing part of the joint Laﬀer-curve for
corporate income tax revenues as a result of a non-cooperative tax-competition game is
quite disturbing. As all reforms of corporate income taxation take place under the political
restriction that member states keep their tax rate autonomy, tax competition per se can
probably not be precluded. When designing the tax base and the sharing mechanism, the
European Commission should be careful to avoid the “wrong” side of the Laﬀer curve.
Third, separating the discussions on the deﬁnition of the tax base for the corporate
income tax and on the apportionment method for tax revenues is unwise, at least if the
incentives for strategic national tax policies are among the criteria that count for the
14choice of a new tax method in the EU. Due to their interplay in tax competition, sharing
rule and tax base should be decided on as a package.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
As αKA(K,K) = −αKB(K,K) for all symmetric investment levels K > 0, we use (2),




























































0(K) − αKAΦ] · [αφ
0(K) + αKAΦ]. (14)
Using (6a) and (6b), the sign of (14) equals
−sgn ([αφ
0(K) − αKAΦ] · [αφ








which is equal in sign to (∂KA/∂tB)(∂KB/∂tB) due to symmetry. 
15Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a symmetric situation: tA = tB and, thus, KA = KB = K. From (14),
∂TA(t,t)
∂tB




































Here we observed that α,αKA > 0 while the sign of φ0 is a priori unclear. The last line
used the deﬁnition of the tax bases which entails φ0(KA) = ∂Φ/∂KA. 
Example for Section 4.1
Suppose that the ﬁrm’s revenues from country i are R(Ki) = βKi(A−Ki) while its costs
are C(Ki) = 0.5K2 (with A,β > 0 as parameters). Proﬁts are R(Ki)−C(Ki), and taxable
proﬁts are assumed to be φ(Ki) = R(Ki) − γC(Ki). Via the FOC (see (4)),
(1 − t)[R
0(Ki) − γC
0(Ki)] = (1 − γ)C
0(Ki), (15)




2β(1 − t) + 1 − γt
. (16)
Observe from (15) that R0 − γC0 < 0 iﬀ γ > 1. The RHS of (13) will, thus, be violated if
(R − αC)/K < αC0 − R0 = C0(1 − γ)/(1 − t) or, equivalently, if
K(t) >
βA
0.5γ + β − (1 − γ)/(1 − t)
. (17)






















16Choose, e.g., γ = 4/3 and β > 5/6 and this condition will hold for all t ∈ (0,1]. Hence,
even without knowledge of the precise value of tN, the Nash-equilibrium tax rate of tax
competition under property-share apportionment is ineﬃciently high. 
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